AMERICA'S REPOPULATING OF JIHADISTS IN
THE ISLAMIC WORLD
A comment on American attitudes in relation to Da'ish, the Houthis and the Arab
Spring
Preamble:
The one contemplating the American policy towards a number of hot files
in the Islamic world will find that one of the main objectives of American
policy is to create hotbeds of internal conflicts that assume the character
of confrontations between jihadists and the ruling regimes, so that all
jihadists are eventually absorbed in conflicts with these regimes, so that the
trend calling for confrontation with non-Islamic countries decreases or better
even fades away.
We, however, must first realize that the American policy is
characterized by a great deal of flexibility and aims at a number of major
objectives, including the Great Middle East Project and the repopulation of
jihadists project. Like other policies, this policy creates some events and
invests on others, and it probably employs a certain event for the benefit of
one of its objectives, and if that fails then it tries to employ that event in
the direction of another goal, as examples mentioned later will show, God
willing.
First: The repopulating of jihadists is
one of the gains of the Americans from Da'ish
We have dealt in the article "Da'ish and the three truths
(Exaggeration in accusations of unbelief - Mania of statehood - Employment of
enemies to their extremism)," with the debate about the Da'ish group and
what some report that Da'ish is the creation of the CIA or the Iranian
Intelligence. We mentioned that, at the very least, the United States and Iran
are the parties which benefit the most from the presence of "Da'ish,"
and that the Sunnis are the party most harmed by that group's existence, since
all its mistakes are attributed to the Sunnis, though Da'ish directs all its military
arsenal, in most cases, against the Sunnis; for it adopts the strategy of
"fighting close enemies first."
We will not
talk here about Da'ish and its origins, but suffice it here to emphasize that
that group represents the most extreme form of the policy of "close
enemies first". Da'ish has passed the stage of regarding governments as
their closest enemy, and topped that by the fact that the Jihadi factions that
do not recognize the Caliphate of their alleged Caliph would be considered a
close enemy if compared to Bashar!
They also
believe that fighting the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt -
despite the geographical distance - is their first priority.
This can be illustrated as follows:
Jihadists
between fighting the close enemy and fighting the far one
- The strategy that fighting "the close enemy" is of
more priority than fighting the "far enemy" is a strategy upon which
many of the groups dubbed as jihadist since the sixties of the last century
clearly described by Sayed Imam in his book "Al-'Omdatu fi 'Idadil 'Oddati
(The Major Reference for the Preparation of Arms (for Jihad)."
- The close enemy here, in the term of these trends, are
governments that they see as apostates. Many of them see that communities also
are apostates, or, at least, they see that there is nothing wrong with carrying
out operations the harm of which is public in a misinterpretation of the
Hadeeth: "They will be resurrected with their intentions."
- In spite of that, the Afghani jihadi field has attracted a
large number of these groups. It also attracted a large number of Muslim youth,
who were not involved in any violence or accusation of unbelief, but went to
fight the Russians, who wreaked havoc in Afghanistan.
- After the defeat of the Russians, there survived a large number
of non-Afghani Mujahideen differing in their methods, particularly with regard
to violence and accusations of unbelief. Eventually, al-Qa'eda was established
under the auspices of Bin Laden. It is clear that the Salafist bringing up of
Bin Laden affected him on the side of taking into account the sanctity of
Muslims. He had an impact on the jihadi groups in this area, although he had been affected by them or, at least
, agreed with them in overlooking matters of the utmost importance with regard
to fighting the unbelievers.
First: Members of the group were not committed to the security contracts
between them and the unbelievers found in the visas that they receive.
Second: Breaching the security contracts granted by the governments of the
Islamic countries to visitors.
Third: Inconsideration
of the pros and cons of the actions they carry out.
- The outcome is that al-Qa'eda has established the foundations
of the belief that the far enemy is the head of evil and thus must be the
primary target of their fight.
- What helped their deployment is that some of their
confrontations represented an Islamic jihad, such as confrontations with
unbelievers who are occupiers of Muslim countries, even with the severe denial
directed to them by Salafi scholars for their operations executed which breach
the conditions previously referred to.
- However, al-Qa'eda absorbed most of the jihadists and their
operations in their countries of origin were less or even stopped
completely.
- Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's confrontations with the Americans and
with the Shiite government in Iraq, despite his alliance with al-Qa'eda, still
started to re-establish the policy of "starting with the close
enemy."
- Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi received his education at the hands of
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who was educated at the hands of Mohammed bin Soroor
bin Nayef Zainul 'Abideen. We
mentioned attributes of this trend marked with the thought of bin Soroor which
opens the door for sliding into forms of exaggeration, including:
A) Indifference in the application of the issue of being excused
because of ignorance in relation to rulers in particular, which turns into a
trend not to apply that issue with all those whom the person has a feud.
B) Not caring to clarify frames of reference in relation to what
makes a person an unbeliever and what does not make him so in relation to
matters that go into the meanings of monotheism such as the principle of Divine
Governance (Al-Hakemeyya) and loyalty and disavowal (Al-Walaa' Wal Baraa').
C) Not caring
to clarify standards of Jihad, and responding to those who practice unislamic
fighting under the name of Jihad, and perhaps some deliberately did so
for: leaving those who are ignorant of the provisions of Jihad to
discipline the opponent.
- This resulted in the expansion of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in
accusing the Shiite in general of being unbelievers, and accusing generally all
those tribes who are carrying arms just because it was proved that there was a
cooperation between some tribes and the Americans.
- As it is the habit of these trends in which dangerously spreads
the phenomenon of waiting for fatalist salvation and jumping over causes,
al-Zarqawi expressed his deep admiration for al-Johayman who claimed being
Al-Mahdi and tried to take control of the Haram in Makkah in the famous
events.
- Abu Omar al-Baghdadi inherited this unhealthy stream of
thinking from al-Zarqawi and added over it the illusion that what he controls
of land in Iraq represents a state. He thus proclaimed the Islamic State of
Iraq and did not pay attention to the responses of his teacher, Sheikh
al-Maqdisi, to these actions.
- Then the matter was inherited by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who added
to it by declaring an Islamic state in Iraq and the Levant, then declared the
caliphate, and then made it permissible to fight all those who refuse to show
their allegiance to him! He directed most of his fighting against the
combatant factions in Syria, a matter which was invested by Bashar and
America as we have pointed out in the article referred to above. Here we will
add detail to the other American major gains of the presence of Da'ish, namely:
The repopulating of jihadists in Muslim countries.
- With al-Zarqawi's victories, then his successors after him,
many of al-Qa'eda affiliates started to rethink whichever has the
priority: The close or the far enemy? The political analyst, Yasser
Aza'aatrah writes that Bin Laden had been suffering in his last days of turning
most of the leaders around him to adopt a policy of "close enemy
first," and this is what enhances the possibility that America wants to
grow the Da'ish strategy at the expense of al-Qa'eda strategy as the first is
less harmful than the second, and that America and its allies deliberately
granted Da'ish fake victories.
- The previous analysis may appear unrealistic when considering
the US alliance which was launched against Da'ish. However, when one
contemplates the situation he will find that it is flowing in the same
direction, and this is evident from:
A)
The strength of the strikes, since it is clear that these are strikes to curb
and not to eliminate.
B)
The extent of geographic centralization, since it is centralized in areas where
the majority are non-Sunnis and therefore America wants to leave the matter to
that majority to serve the partition scheme at the same time.
C)
America's insistence to include Arab States in its alliance against Da'ish -
although there is no need for such a large alliance to eliminate such a group-.
This serves as a confirmation of the scene of re-confrontation between
jihadists and regimes: Da'ish takes revenge from all those whom it can, while
the jihadists in each country take the task of reprisals from existing
governments.
Second:
Was welcoming the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt a part of the policy
of the jihadist repopulation?
America may have been surprised by the revolutions of the Arab Spring,
but it certainly absorbed the surprise quickly, and tried to invest events to
its advantage. In the case of Egypt, it seems that the USA has tried for
a while to give the revolution the colour of secularism in an attempt to make a
heavy strategic gain on the level of thought, for secularism was and still is
in our country confined to a limited group of people, who like to describe
themselves as the elite, which makes dressing such a huge and popular
revolution with the dress of secularism a milestone that could have altered the
course of history.
After the failure of these attempts, which was utterly clear after the
first parliamentary elections, it seems that America attempted to invest the
Egyptian revolution to achieve another goal of its goals. This was trying to
find a formula that contributes to the return of the Egyptian jihadists to
their country, either out of conviction that what was existing is an Islamic
rule or in order to retaliate against those who were able to establish Islamic
rule but did not put that ability into action.
It is no
secret that the Muslim Brotherhood had announced a position of extreme
reservation towards dominating political life in Egypt after the January 25th
revolution. Dr. Mohamed Badi'e, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood had
said in explanation of the decision made by the Brotherhood not to come forward
with a presidential candidate: "because I love Egypt. "
And it is no secret what was said by the Brotherhood leaders themselves
- as in some of Dr. Morsi's recordings - about the impact of the Americans on
changing the Brotherhood's decision.
It is also
no secret that of the most important reasons that prevented the Brotherhood
from paying early attention to the state of mounting institutional anger
is their trust in the international recognition of their legitimacy, and
consequently they turned their backs on institutional anger and slacked in
addressing public anger, which they claimed they intended to deal with in a
timely manner.
It is also
no secret that the main fuel that was driving the Rabe'a platform was that
"the world has not yet recognized the new regime."
Then came their demonstrations in New York against the visit of Al-Sisi
to the United Nations as an evidence that this attempt remains.
The
questions which present themselves are:
Were
Americans honest when they said to Dr. Morsi that they welcome the Brotherhood
in office or were they entrapping them?
(A
reminder: There was a precondition which was not to unit with the Salafis. The
article here, however cannot deal with the dimensions of that precondition at
the moment.)
If they
were truthful, then why are they so? If they were preparing a trap, then what
is it?
If Dr.
Morsi's rule had seen the mass return of jihadi leaders; then why did they come
when they believe that Mubarak, Mursi and Sisi (later) are all
unbelievers?
How had
such a truce been concluded between the trends that accuse rulers of being
unbelievers and the state in the period of Dr. Morsi's rule although they
accuse him too of being an unbeliever?
Was it possible that those would explode against Dr. Morsi at the first
disagreement?
Could
the answer be that the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood would have led to
either:
- An institutional conflict.
- Or a clash with the miserable economic reality and then with
the people.
- Or the clash with the confrontational trends
which inevitably will raise the roof of their ambitions and their patience will
not last long in relation to an "Islamic" president to remain in
power without causing drastic changes in legislative districts and in foreign
policy?
In fact,
the first two issues have taken place, and each fed the other.
Their
occurrence delayed the onset of the third, and also to the clear sympathy from
extremist groups in word and deed with Dr. Morsi even though they may have
begun to launch a campaign accusing him of disbelieve.
It seems
that from among the major challenges that faced Dr. Morsi was the severe
discrepancy between evading the first possibility and the third one.
Examples
include the presence of the Zomor Family in the October celebrations which
angered institutions and the closeness which was initially between Dr. Morsi
and President El-Sisi (the time he was still the minister of defence) probably
angered many within the Brotherhood group itself.
It seems
that America would have preferred the third option because it would lead to the
return of all Egyptian jihadists to Egypt and entering into a war with the
regime under the rule of an "Islamic" president, which would have
increased the absurdity of the scene.
This may be one of the reasons for the interpretation of the American
position after ousting Dr. Morsi.
Comment:
Between Egypt, Libya and Tunisia
It seems
that the situation in Libya has led to a large part of what is targeted; where
jihadists belonging to the Maghreb and other countries gathered in Libya. They
united to fight Gaddafi and then differences cropped between them and secular
powers, and between them and tribal forces. Their alliances with the Muslim
Brotherhood varied, and Libya became an epicentre gathering these jihadists,
either for war against Egypt or for the purpose of internal wars.
The
situation in Tunisia is that the Brotherhood have absorbed the lesson. We do
not mean by that what they offered of methodological concessions for we do not
agree with them in what they did. Rather, we mean what they offered of
political flexibility the similarity of which we frequently advised the
Brotherhood in Egypt to follow. They, however, rejected it and no wonder they
did, but the wonder lies in those who consider the same policies as betrayal in
Egypt while in Tunisia they consider it as politeness and God has His ways with
His creatures.
Third:
The rule of the Houthis in Yemen in the footsteps of reinstatment of jihadists
San'aa falling in the hands of the Houthis and then Yemeni President
Mansour Hadi rushing to hold an adhesion reconciliation with them, despite his
statements about an international and regional conspiracy against Yemen will
remain a puzzle.
Who advised
the Reform Government controlled by the Brotherhood to raise the price of
fuel?
How did the
Houthis despite their sectarianism lead demonstrations objecting to these
policies?
How did
those demonstrations turn into a revolution?
How did the
Yemeni army surrender so easily?
Many
questions will not find answers except in what was said by the Yemeni president
about a regional and international conspiracy.
One wonders what the parties to this international conspiracy are
seeking?
The answer may be of multiple possibilities. It remains, however, that
the result that almost brings all analysts together is that the presence of the
Houthis in power and seizing the sovereign ministries means that many Yemeni
tribes will carry arms, and also means the return of many members of al-Qa'eda
to Yemen, which was a safe haven for them during a certain period.
The
Brotherhood in the Reform Party believe that this ambush was prepared for them,
and that their public committees get to be involved in war with the Houthis and
are thus branded as terrorists. For that reason they left San'aa for the
Houthis and did not swallow the bait. This is an undoubtedly plausible
concept and it entirely pours in creating hotbeds of tension both between the
Brotherhood and the Houthis, and between al-Qaeda and the Houthis. Questions remain that are addressed to the
Muslim Brotherhood:
Did the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen absorb the lesson
of their counterparts in Egypt, or is it that the Brotherhood in all other
countries are more mature than those of Egypt?
In any
case, why does Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood insist on their position, and even on
distrusting all those who advise them to follow in the steps of their brethren
in other countries?
This is a sub-question but one that strongly presents itself.
Conclusion:
It now
appears that the map of repopulation is complete and can include all those who
are related to al-Qa'eda. There is a hotbed in Iraq, another in Libya and a
third in Yemen with continuous attempts to drag Egypt into this series.
We should know that we are approaching that time when many feeding
factors of the methods of unbelief accusation and violence shall combine. Such
factors include frustration and urgency and hidden hands playing on parallel
lines, seeking a large number of objectives, and having the flexibility to move
from one objective to the other.
The
most prominent of these objectives are:
1-
Repartition of Islamic country.
2-
Repopulating jihadis in their countries to fight their countries and
communities.
And creative or let's say "programmed" chaos remain the main
method to achieve these policies.
All that which is mentioned above should be put into everyone's consideration
so as to stop playing with fire and for everyone to be aware that we are all in
a single vessel which would either survive and so would all of us or sink
taking all of us with it.
We ask God for mercy and happiness in this world and the hereafter.
By: Abdul Mun'im Al-Shahat - Spokesman of the Salafist Call.
www.anasalafy.com
